• Lehman doubled-down on risk in order to make a profit. In doing so, Lehman increased the amount it was prepared to lose as result of its investments from $2.3 billion to $4.0 billion.
This constituted a 74% increase in its risk limits, enacted during a declining market.
• Lehman frequently exceeded its self-imposed risk limits. At the same time, Lehman compounded its risk through inaccurate valuations of the assets upon which the inflated risks rested. The result was that Lehman's leverage was much higher than was reported to the public and the artificially increased asset values caused Lehman to take more risk than was understood.
VALUATION: CONSCIOUS FAILURE TO ACCURATELY VALUE ASSETS.
• As the economic downturn became more pronounced, Lehman inflated the value of its assets, thereby further concealing the extent to which Lehman had increased its risk and leverage.
• In the year preceding its bankruptcy, Lehman grossly overstated its expected return on investments.
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUATION POLICIES
• Lehman's 74% increase in risk was magnified by its systemic failure in the twelve months preceding bankruptcy to properly value its assets, thereby disguising the true level of risk Lehman was actually assuming.
• The net effect was that Lehman was a hollow shell before it went bankrupt.
• The precedential value established by the Examiner's Report is that Lehman had a license to fail. Lehman acted within the constraints of the law but went bankrupt because of a series of ambitious, yet risky business decisions. The law permitted Lehman to do this by allowing the adoption of dangerous business practices that could not be sustained in a volatile economy. It was not unlawful for Lehman to secretly increase its degree of risk, deliberately violate its increased risk limits, and surreptitiously backdate its documents to disguise violations of its risk limitations. Furthermore, it was not unlawful for Lehman to unreasonably overvalue its assets, thereby further disguising its leverage and, ultimately, the magnitude of the risk it was taking with its depositors' money. The Examiner's Report is likely to be the only basis for the Court's determination of which, if any, of Lehman's creditors "with millions of dollars in claims at stake" will be able to recover. 2 In spite of this, there has been minimal consideration of the detailed findings which can be found interspersed throughout the Examiner's Report. There was a systematic flaw in Lehman's valuation of its PTG portfolio because the valuation of "these assets [was] based on whether the development was proceeding according to the project's business plan and not the price a buyer would pay for the asset." 34 Consequently, "the PTG portfolio, which was valued at approximately $9.6 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007," was written down by $1.1 billion over the first three quarters of 2008. 35 There was sufficient evidence to indicate that Lehman did not value PTG assets in light of the rates of return that would be required to convince investors to purchase them. RWLs. 71 Of these four trades used as benchmarks, three were ultimately cancelled and one was never entered into Lehman's trading system. 72 However, the valuations determined for the third quarter of 2008 were within the range of reasonableness, and when compared to the Examiner's model prices were determined not to be unreasonable.
METHODOLGY

73
Like RWLs, the trading desk was the first to value RMBS, subject to the PCG's review.
74
RMBS were valued in one of two ways: (1) by looking to the market value of recent trade prices or (2) through application of model price tests. 75 The process was as follows:
The PCG for all of the CDOs, only the largest CDOs. 98 After the PCG conducted its independent valuation, it would check its numbers against the desk traders' numbers. 99 If the variance was too great, the PCG would meet with the trader to determine the "appropriate" price. 100 While one-third of Lehman's CDOs were tested using one of the two preferred methods, 25% of the CDOs were not "affirmatively priced" by the PCG and were instead approved without question "because the desk had already written down the For the riskier junior tranches of the Ceago position, the PCG used discount coupon cash flows taken from the Caego at "the swap rate corresponding to the projected tenor of the bonds." 108 The discount rates used by the PCG were "significantly understated" because a lower discount rate was placed on the junior tranches than the senior tranches. 2007.
117
The valuation method for derivatives differed depending on the underlying assets on which the derivative contract was based, and no single method can be used to price all derivatives. 118 As a result, the Examiner drew no conclusions regarding Lehman's methodology; rather, his findings pertain only to the final valuations for the derivative positions. The Capital Markets Finance group was responsible for daily revenue analysis and reporting, validation of inventory valuations and interfacing with internal and external auditors and regulators. The Product Control Group performed price verification procedures for derivatives on a monthly basis. The Complex Derivatives Review Committee reviewed complex transactions to ensure that they were modeled, valued and booked appropriately. Finally, the Model Control 117 Id. at 572. 118 Id. at 573. 119 Id. at 573. 120 Examiner's Report, Vol. 2, at 573-74. 121 Id. at 574; See Id. at 575-76 (CSAs typically provide a 'threshold amount' of risk exposure, below which a counterparty need not post collateral. For example, if Lehman valued a derivative contract at a present value of $20 million, and the CSA provided for a $5 million threshold, then Lehman's counterparty would post $15 million in collateral. However, derivative counterparties seek to avoid posting collateral because it diminishes liquidity and imposes opportunity cost. 121 Therefore, a counterparty would not accept Lehman's claim of a derivative's value without performing its own analysis, and vice-versa.) (internal citations omitted). 122 Examiner's Report, Vol. 2, at 573-574.
Committee reviewed and approved the models used to mark derivatives positions.
123
As with its other assets, Lehman's trading desks determined the marks it reported for its derivatives assets, "and these marks were subject to price testing by Lehman's [PCG] ."
124 Due
to the large number of derivatives held by Lehman and the different valuation methods, the Examiner focused on the PCG's price verification for derivatives. To perform price verification of these assets, Lehman's Product Control Group obtained third-party marks for individual CUSIPs 128 from data providers Fitch Ratings ("Fitch") and Markit. Where the Product Control Group had only one Fitch or Markit price for a particular security, it adopted that price as its mark. Where both Fitch and Markit prices were available, the average of the two was used.
129
Although there was some variance between the desk marks and the PCG's valuations, "there
[did] not appear to be a bias towards either under-or overstatement." 130 As of May 31, 2008, the variance on valuations for CDS on ABS was $80 million, and the variance on valuations for 123 Id. at 579. 124 Id. at 578. 125 Id. at 578. 126 Id. at 579. 127 Id. at 580. 128 Examiner's Report, Vol. 2, at 580 n.2054 ("CUSIP refers to the 9-character alphanumeric security identifier established by the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures."). 129 Id. at 580. 130 Id. at 580-81.
CDS on CDO was negative $20 million. would not normally be caught by the review process unless it exceeded a test variance. 141 However, even if the marks are identical between internal and third-party transfer data, using internal transfers would make it appear that there were a greater number of trades behind the valuation of the asset, which would lead to a higher confidence in the marks.
142
Lehman's assessment of an internal credit rating was an essential part of valuing debt instruments that were not rated by a rating agency. In general, when there is an impairment of value of debt for a company due to increased risk, "the value of the company's equity should also be reduced due to the same risk." 162 Bawag PSK ("Bawag") is a privately held financial service company operating principally in Austria which was found to have been assessed an improper equity mark after an impairment of debt.
163
Lehman ultimately decided against a 10% write-down of Bawag's equity even after having already taken a write-down on the corresponding debt component. 164 "It is highly irregular for an equity position to remain unchanged when a debt security sitting higher in the capital structure is written down since both securities would likely be impacted by the same risk factors 157 Id. 158 Id. at 595-96, 601; "Level 3 assets have no readily available pricing mechanism and therefore are less liquid than Level 1 and 2 assets." Examiner's Report, Vol. 1, at 62 n.171. 159 See Examiner's Report, Vol. 2, at 601-606. 160 Id. at 601. 161 Id. 162 Id. at 601-02. 163 Id. at 602. 164 Id.
III. Lehman's Acquisition and Valuation of Archstone
"Lehman's failure to recognize and react to market changes."
The best representation of Lehman's risk management and valuation process is its acquisition of Archstone, a $22 billion joint venture with Tishman Speyer. 173 Notably,
Archstone was Lehman's largest commercial real estate investment. 174 Archstone was a REIT that was engaged in the acquisition, development, and operation of apartment communities. 175 There were a number of issues with the timing of Archstone's acquisition and the profitability of the investment as a whole due to the real estate and credit markets at the time. 176 These factors made Archstone a risky investment that ultimately did not meet profitability expectations. To determine the reasonableness of Lehman's valuation practices, the Examiner assessed a reasonable range of values because of the absence of directly applicable market data. 177 The core problem with Archstone's valuation was Lehman's failure to recognize and react to market changes. For example, Lehman overestimated its cash flow assumptions despite significant evidence supporting different numbers. 178 Lehman conducted an internal analysis which showed that the rent growth rate it was applying to Archstone was 1.9 to 3.5 percentage points higher than comparable competitors' assumptions, yet Lehman did not adequately adjust its own assumptions. 179 
